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SECONDARY EMPLOYER NOT BOUND BY
"HOT CARGO" CLAUSE
Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB,
357 U.S. 93 (1958)
The Sand Door and Plywood Company of Los Angeles supplied
general construction contractors with doors manufactured by the Paine
Lumber Company of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, a non-union plant. The
Carpenters (Local 1976) refused to install the doors. Sand filed charges
with the National Labor Relations Board' contending that the union was
illegally encouraging its members to effect a secondary boycott2 in vio-
lation of the Taft-Hartley Act.3 The union maintained that its action
was proper because a "hot cargo" clause4 was contained in its collective
bargaining agreement with the general contractors. The NLRB ordered
the union to cease and desist from the acts charged .by Sand and the order
was upheld on appeal.' The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
the decision, holding that a "hot cargo" clause in a collective bargaining
agreement cannot be asserted as a defense to an alleged unfair labor
practice prescribed by Section 8(b) (4) (A) when the employer does not
consent to the use of the clause.
6
The position of the NLRB toward the "hot cargo" clause as a
defense to Section 8 (b) (4) (A) has been unstable, usually changing with
the appointment of new personnel. When first confronted with the issue
in Conway's Express,' the Board held that the employer consented in
advance to the secondary boycott and acquiesced in its enforcement.
' Sand Door and Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
229 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (A) (Supp. 1951). "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents .... (4) to engage in, or encourage
the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to per-
form any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any
employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other-
wise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,
or to cease doing business with any other person.
329 U.S.C. § 141 (1947) (Supp. 1951).
4 A typical "hot cargo" clause usually reads: "It shall not be a violation
of this contract and it shall not be cause for discharge if any employee or em-
ployees refuse to go through a picket line of a union or refuse to handle unfair
goods." Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 741 (1953).
5 NLRB v Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir.
1957).
6 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). The
Court heard simultaneously an appeal on the same issue from the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia. It reversed the decision in favor of the
Teamsters and affirmed the decision pertaining to the Machinists. Teamsters
Union v NLRB, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
787 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949).
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There was, therefore, literally no strike or concerted refusal to work as
the employees were exercising their contractual privilege.
In 1954, with three newly appointed members,' the Board shifted
its position.' Two members declared the clause invalid because it was
contrary to the public policy expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act.1" The
chairman," in a concurring opinion, held the clause valid but unenforce-
able because the factual situation differed from Conway's Express. He
stated that the union unlawfully induced and encouraged its members
to refuse to work.12 One year later, the Board13 further limited the use
of the clause as a defense by not allowing the union to appeal directly
to its members to refuse to handle "unfair goods"; only the employer
could instruct the employees to cease handling the "unfair goods" even
though the union has the obligation of notifying its members of their
contractual rights. 4
Since the American Iron and Machine Works case,' 5 a union is
restricted from appealing to its members directly or indirectly even
though the employer may acquiesce in the refusal to handle "unfair
goods." The language of this decision, as pointed out by the dissent, is so
broad that union officials cannot discuss a "hot cargo" clause at a
membership meeting.' 6 Just as a majority of the Board has not been able
to agree on whether a "hot cargo" clause is a valid defense to Section
8(b) (4) (A), similarly United States courts of appeals have not been
in accord.'
7
The existing conflict as to how the "hot cargo" clause can be valid
and yet unenforceable is not resolved by the Supreme Court's decision.
The Court held that the clause was valid, but that it was not a defense
when the employer explicitly instructed his employees to handle the
8 Guy Farmer, Phillip Ray Rodgers and Albert C. Beeson.
9 McAllister Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954).
1ORodgers and Beeson held that the intent of Congress was to protect
neutral employers and the public welfare from labor disputes; therefore a
secondary employer could not contract with the union to waive the statutory
protection of the public interest.
1 Guy Farmer.
12Murdock and Peterson, the dissenting members, upheld the validity of
the clause and stated that the facts were similar to those in Conway's Express.
13 There was one new member, Boyd Leedom, who replaced Albert Beeson.
14 Sand Door and Plywood Co., supra note 1.
15 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956). Stephen Bean was a new addition to the Board,
having replaced Chairman Farmer who had resigned.
'6Id. at 805.
17Two Courts of Appeals, the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia,
have upheld the use of the clause as a defense to Section 8(b) (4) (A). Teamsters
Union v. NLRB, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 245
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1957); Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952). The
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, has held that the clause is not a defense when
the employer does not consent to the use of the clause. NLRB v. Local 1976,
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957).
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"unfair" goods.'" This is essentially the same conclusion reached by
Chairman Farmer in the Sand Door and Plywood case.19 The majority
feels that Congress intended to give to the employer a freedom of choice
to relieve himself of the pressures of a secondary boycott. This freedom
of choice must be available to the employer at the time the situation arises
even though the union and the employer entered into a prior agree-
ment.20 Because of business practicalities the employer must be left free
from coercion to make the appropriate decision. Looking at the practical
aspect of the situation, the Court feels that the union is powerful enough
to pressure the employer into making this provision in the first instance.
1
Thus, it cannot actually be said that the "hot cargo" provision was
voluntarily made at the time of the collective bargaining agreement.
The major premise of the Court is that the intent of Congress was
to reserve to the secondary employer a freedom of choice upon whether
or not to honor a "hot cargo" clause. The legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act reveals no specific prohibition on including the clauses
in a collective bargaining agreement.2 2 Furthermore, there is nothing in
the language of Section 8(b)(4)(A) which prohibits the type of
employer-union cooperation contemplated by these contracts in effecting
a secondary boycott.23 The union is placed in the curious position of
having a valid agreement which cannot be enforced against an unwilling
employer. The union cannot appeal to its members to engage in conduct
permitted by the contract. The result is that the union is left without an
adequate remedy. If it should sue the employer to obtain specific per-
formance of the contract, it is highly doubtful that the Court would
allow the union to achieve indirectly by injunction what it cannot achieve
directly through the inducement of its members.24 If the union should
maintain an action for damages,25 the amount would be too speculative
and more than likely preclude the union from recovering a judgment.26
The employer is put in the enviable position of being able to exercise his
freedom of choice twice: at the time of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and at the time the appeal for a secondary boycott is made by the
union. The employer may now repudiate this part of the agreement
18Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v NLRB, supra note 6.
19 Sand Door and Plywood Co., supra note 1.
2 0 Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, supra note 6.
2 1 Id. at 106.
2293 CONG. REc. 4198, 4199 (1947) (remarks of Senators Pepper, Taft).
2329 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (A) (1947) (Supp. 1951).
2 4 See Hot Cargo Clauses, 25 U. CHI. L. Rav. 182 (1957).
2529 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1947). "Suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court...
having jurisdiction of the parties .... 
20Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96 (8th Cir. 1901).
See generally, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 51 (1) (1932); CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§1020 (1950).
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with impunity, 27 and this is directly contrary to the purpose of the Taft-
Hartley Act concerning collective bargaining."8
Left unsolved is the serious problem of the utility of the "hot
cargo" clause itself. The Court refused to consider whether or not the
clause was repugnant to the policy of the Taft-Hartley Act and the
intent of Congress. The confusion over the relationship of the "hot
cargo" clause to the secondary boycott stems from what Congress said
about Section 8(b) (4) (A) and what the language of that section actu-
ally says. Congress did intend to protect innocent third parties from
labor disputes in which they were not involved.2" However, it is not
apparent whether Congress intended such protection to extend to an em-
ployer who consented in advance to being involved. Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
was intended to protect not only the neutral employer, but also the
public in general. It is in the public interest to have maintained the
free flow of commerce and the prevention of labor disputes. If these
aims can be disrupted voluntarily by the secondary employer when he
puts into effect a secondary boycott in the absence of a "hot cargo"
provision, it cannot be argued that there has been a waiver of the public
interest. If this action can be carried out voluntarily by the union and
the secondary employer, it should necessarily follow that the parties
could contract to achieve the same purpose. From the language of
Section 8(b) (4) (A), it would appear that unions are not prevented
from engaging in secondary boycotts but rather from using certain means
to effect a secondary boycott."0 Therefore, it could be argued that a
contract containing a "hot cargo" clause is not repugnant to the policy
of the Taft-Hartley Act because the conduct it authorizes was not
intended to be prohibited by the act.
The Supreme Court decision still permits three views as to the
validity of the "hot cargo" clauses: that it is invalid; that it is valid and
enforceable; and that it is valid but enforceable only when the employer
consents. The need for legislative action is obvious.
John I. Kulig
27Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (dis-
senting opinion); Sand Door and Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1957) (dis-
senting opinion).
2829 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1947). "[I]t is the policy of the United States that-
(a) . . . the best interests of employers and employees can most satisfactorily be
secured . . . through the processes of conferences and collective bargaining between
employers and the representatives of their employees."
2993 CoNG. Rec. 4198 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). "It has been set
forth that there are good secondary boycotts and bad secondary boycotts. Our
committee heard evidence for weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us
any difference between different kinds of boycotts. So we have so broadened the
provision dealing with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor
practice."
3 OJoliet Contractor's Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952). Judge
Learned Hand stated, "The objective of the act must be accomplished by the
specific means which the section defines and not otherwise."
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